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In Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 1 I relied 
heavily on the prior work of Professors Earl Maltz and John Har-
rison, two of the most careful, dispassionate, and learned scholars 
of the constitutional doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Now they have written responses to that article. Interestingly, 
Maltz devotes his essay to questioning whether public education 
was considered a privilege or immunity of citizenship-a point 
on which Harrison, without elaboration, says I am "correct"2-
while Harrison devotes his essay to a textual and doctrinal analy-
sis of how segregation could be considered unequal, a point that 
Maltz passes by in silence. I will devote my response to Maltz, 
since he, unlike Harrison, ultimately rejects my thesis that the 
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment supports 
the holding in Brown. 
Maltz contends that the Fourteenth Amendment compels 
the states to fund black and white schools equally and may em-
power Congress to prohibit segregation, but does not forbid seg-
regation of its own force. Is Maltz's analysis of the evidence 
consistent with this interpretation of the Amendment? 
Let us begin with the enforcement power. Maltz hypothe-
sizes that some members of Congress may have voted for the 
schools provision in the civil rights bill, even though they did not 
believe that de jure school segregation violates Section One of 
the Amendment, because they understood the congressional 
power to enforce the Amendment under Section Five to go be-
yond the dictates of Section One. Maltz argues that this would 
make sense of Senator Sherman's confused speech in which he 
appeared to concede the constitutionality of segregated schools, 
* William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 
1. 81 Va. L. Rev. 947 (1995). 
2. John Harrison, Equality, Race Discrimination, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
13 Const. Comm. 243, 243 n.4 (1996). 
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while voting for a bill outlawing school segregation and against 
amendments that would have allowed separate but equal 
schools.3 
The difficulty with this hypothesis is that neither Sherman 
nor any other supporter of the bill referred to any supposed dif-
ference between the substantive requirements of Section One 
and the discretionary power of Congress under Section Five 
when defending the constitutionality of the bill. Maltz cites 
speeches by Robert Hale4 and William Lawrences giving broad 
interpretations of the Section Five power. But Hale, who 
proudly identified himself as the sole Republican representative 
to have voted against the Fourteenth Amendment, offered his 
interpretation of Section Five as a criticism of the Amendment,6 
not as a justification for supporting the school segregation bill 
(which, indeed, he voted against?). Nor is Lawrence (who, unlike 
Hale, was a leading supporter of the bill) an example. It is true 
that Lawrence offered a fairly expansive interpretation of Section 
Five, but he also explained in some detail why the school deseg-
regation bill was required by Section One. He concluded: "The 
fourteenth amendment was designed to secure this equality of 
rights; and we have no discretion to say that we will not enforce 
its provisions. There is no question of discretion involved except 
as to the means we may employ. The real question is, whether, 
knowing our duty, we will perform it."s Many other Republican 
supporters of the bill similarly argued that the bill merely pro-
vided enforcement for rights under Section One, and that Con-
3. Maltz says that Shennan "stated that he viewed the maintenance of segregated 
schools as constitutional, so long as the black schools received their pro rata share of 
school funding." Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions-A Re-
sponse to Professor McConnell, 13 Const. Comm. 223, 225 ( 1996). While Maltz's reading 
is legitimate, it might be more accurate to say the speech was a bit of a muddle. After 
stating agreement with a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court approving "separate 
schools for colored children" in "certain cases defined by the law," Shennan stated that in 
"ordinary cases" black and white children were educated in mixed schools-a situation 
that he praised at some length. Following this, he stated his "opinion" that in the South, 
"for a time it might be a matter of municipal regulation, it might be a matter of conven-
ience assented to both by whites and blacks to keep them in separate schools." Cong. 
Globe, 42d Cong., 2nd Sess. 3193 (1872). This might indicate that he believed that a tran-
sitional period would be pennissible (all deliberate speed?), or, alternatively. that he was 
distinguishing-like many Republican supporters of the bill-between de jure segrega-
tion and de facto segregation by common consent of both races. 
4. Maltz, 13 Const. Comm. at 226 (cited in note 3). 
5. ld. 
6. 3 Cong. Rec. 979-80 (1875). 
7. Id. at 1011. 
8. 2 Cong. Rec. 414 (1874). 
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gress had no power to go beyond this.9 Even Professor Michael 
Klarman, a critic of the originalist argument for desegregation, 
finds the evidence "persuasive" that "congressional support for 
school desegregation should be understood not merely as a pol-
icy preference, but also as probative of constitutional interpreta-
tion-that is, most congressmen at the time would have 
understood the congressional enforcement power under Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment as limited in scope to the 
rights protected against state interference by Section One. "10 
Thus, while it is logically possible that the bill could have 
been justified on the theory that Congress had power to go be-
yond the requirements of Section One, there is no direct evi-
dence in support of this interpretation, and a great deal of 
evidence to the contrary. 
Maltz next argues that the debates over the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875 are unreliable indicators of the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which was proposed in 1866 and rati-
fied in 1868. I have addressed this issue elsewhere,u and will not 
repeat those arguments. Maltz makes the point, however, that 
the jury service provision of the 1875 Act is inconsistent with the 
proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment "had no impact on 
political rights, including the right to serve on juries."12 He sug-
gests that if the Act reflects an inaccurate understanding of the 
Amendment with respect to juries, it might be similarly inaccu-
rate with respect to school segregation. 
The jury provisions of the 1875 Act, however, were de-
fended not on the basis of the potential jurors' right to serve 
(which would be a political right) but on the basis of the litigants' 
right not to have members of their race excluded from the jury 
box, which could be seen as a due process right, an equal protec-
tion right, or a privilege or immunity of citizenship.I3 One of the 
most serious obstacles to enforcement of civil rights for the 
freedmen was the unwillingness of all-white juries in the South to 
do justice. The jury provisions of the 1875 Act were essential to 
enforcing the civil rights of blacks who needed to defend their 
9. See speeches cited in Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation 
Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947, 1115-17 (1995). 
10. Michael Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response 
to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881, 1882 (1995). 
11. McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. at 1105-07, 1115-17 (cited in note 9); Michael W. 
McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 Va. 
L. Rev. 1937, 1944-47 (1995). 
12. Maltz, 13 Const. Comm. at 227-28 (cited in note 3). 
13. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 848 (1872) (Sen. Frelinghuysen); McCon-
nell, 81 Va. L. Rev. at 1064 & n.584 (cited in note 9). 
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rights in court. So understood, the jury provisions were consis-
tent with the original understanding of Section One. 
Maltz next argues that it was unlikely that the Amendment 
was understood to affect school segregation, in light of the un-
popularity of mixed schools throughout the country. While this 
is a good point, it cannot be decisive; black suffrage was equally 
unpopular with white voters and the Fifteenth Amendment un-
questionably was understood as giving the vote to blacks. It is 
apparent that Republicans during Reconstruction were willing to 
buck public opinion in the service of constitutional reform. 
Maltz buttresses this argument with the point that Congress 
continued to support the segregated school system in the District 
of Columbia. "To contend that Republicans would at the same 
time knowingly act against school segregation by a nationally-
applicable constitutional amendment," Maltz comments, "is to 
attribute to them an almost Orwellian mentality."14 Perhaps. 
But the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the District of 
Columbia, and Congress has been known to enact for the coun-
try laws that it does not apply in its own backyard. In any event, 
the same congressional forces who fought for school desegrega-
tion through the civil rights bill also came close to requiring de-
segregation in the District (winning in the Senate by a margin of 
35-20 on a procedural vote,1s and losing in the House by 71-88, 
on a vote marked by extrodinarilly many absences16). Their tac-
tical judgment to devote political energies after 1871 to nation-
wide reform, which appeared to be within their reach, should not 
be mistaken for a considered constitutional judgment in favor of 
segregation.11 
In any event, as Maltz agrees, the question "ultimately de-
pends on a doctrinal analysis of Section 1,"18 rather than on any 
indirect evidence of political opinion. Maltz argues that the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause could not have been understood to 
forbid school segregation because it requires equality only with 
respect to "rights of national citizenship,"19 and the right to at-
tend public schools "is rather clearly not included" among 
these.zo 
14. Maltz, 13 Const. Comm. at 229 (cited in note 3). 
15. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3124 (1872). 
16. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1367 (1871). 
17. For a fuller treatment of this issue, see McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. at 977-80 
(cited in note 9). 
18. Maltz, 13 Const. Comm. at 229 (cited in note 3). 
19. !d. at 231. 
20. !d. 
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As I will explain below, this doctrinal argument is questiona-
ble. But the real puzzle is how it can be squared with Maltz's 
own interpretation: that the Fourteenth Amendment compels the 
states to fund black and white schools equally but does not forbid 
segregation. If the "right to attend public schools"2J was a "local 
right"22 and not a right "associated with national citizenship,"23 
then the schools could not only be segregated, but they could be 
unequal. Indeed, black children could be excluded from the 
schools altogether. This was an argument even many opponents 
of the Act repudiated.24 
Perhaps Maltz would respond that the constitutional re-
quirement of equality of resources is grounded in the Equal Pro-
tection Clause rather than the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
But for this claim to be persuasive, one would have to argue that 
the "equality" required for equal protection is different from the 
"equality'' required for privileges or immunities-that segrega-
tion is unequal for purposes of one Clause but not the other. 
Maltz cites no evidence to support this theory, and I am not 
aware of any.2s Supporters of the school desegregation bill in-
voked both Clauses,26 and the general shift from privileges or 
immunities to equal protection was a reaction to the Slaughter-
house decision rather than to any differences between the 
Clauses with respect to the legitimacy of segregation.n More-
over, to the extent that Maltz intends this theory as an explana-
21. ld. 
22. ld. at 230. 
23. ld. 
24. See 2 Cong. Rec. app. 359 (1874) (statement of Sen. Merriman); 2 Cong. Rec. 
555 (1874) (statement of Rep. Vance). 
25. Harrison distinguishes between several different forms of equality, focusing par-
ticularly on the difference between "requirements of universal equality as to certain legal 
rights," Harrison, 13 Const. Comm. at 247 (cited in note 2), and "anti-discrimination 
rules," id. at 248. noting that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment is most plausi-
bly understood as an example of the former, while the prohibition on segregation is best 
understood as the latter. My researches into the debates over the 1875 Act have not 
uncovered any evidence that this distinction was understood or thought significant at the 
time. But even assuming that the distinction has importance for interpretation of the 
Amendment, it would not support the notion that the conception of equality in the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause is different from the conception of equality in the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Harrison gives both Clauses as examples of the conception of equality as 
a requirement of universal equality as to certain legal rights. Id. at 246. 
26. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 761-63 (1872) (Sen. Carpenter, relying on 
Privileges or Immunities Clause); id. at 843-44 (Sen. Sherman, relying on Privileges or 
Immunities Clause); 2 Cong. Rec. 340 (1873) (Rep. Butler, relying on Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause); id. at app. 26 (Sen. Edmunds, relying on Equal Protection Clause); 2 Cong. 
Rec. 409 (1874) (Rep. Elliott, relying on Equal Protection Clause); id. at 412-414 (Rep. 
Lawrence, relying on Equal Protection Clause). 
27. See McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. at 1002-04, 1070 (cited in note 9). 
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tion for Senator Sherman's position, it does not work. Sherman 
labeled "the right of the parent of every child to have that child 
share on equal terms and equal facilities with all others in partici-
pating and sharing in the school fund" as among "the rights, im-
munities, and privileges of citizens."2s If Maltz is right, then 
Sherman was wrong. 
Maltz's assumption that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
applies only to rights "associated with national citizenship,"29 is, 
moreover, implausible (despite its rough congruence with the 
holding in the Slaughterhouse cases3o). The rights most clearly 
falling within the Clause-namely, the rights protected by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866: to make and enforce contracts, acquire, 
own, and dispose of property, sue and be sued, be subject to 
equal penalties, and the like-have no obvious connection to na-
tional citizenship. These rights arise under state law, and become 
rights of national citizenship only by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself. Contrary to Slaughterhouse, the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not confine itself to what already were rights 
of national citizenship; rather, it converted certain rights that pre-
viously had arisen under state law into rights of national 
citizenship. 
In any event, many Republicans associated education with 
national citizenship, linking access to school to access to the bal-
lot. Sumner, for example, argued: 
In a republic Education is indispensable. A republic without 
education is like the creature of imagination, a human being 
without a soul, living and moving blindly, with no just sense of 
the present or the future. It is a monster. Such have been the 
rebel States. They have been for years nothing less than polit-
ical monsters. But such they must be no longer.31 
Of course, this was disputed. Lyman Trumbull, for example, said 
that the right to go to school "is not any right at all" because it 
"depends upon what the law of the locality is."32 But, as ex-
plained in the Originalism article, Trumbull's was a minority po-
sition-implying, as it did, that the Fourteenth Amendment had 
no application to public schools, even if blacks were excluded al-
together. In any event, to the extent that public schooling was 
associated with republican citizenship, it would fall within even 
28. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3193 (1872). 
29. Maltz, 13 Const. Comm. at 230 (cited in note 3). 
30. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 64-65 (1873). 
31. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 166-67 (1867). 
32. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3190 (1872). 
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Maltz's limited definition of the scope of the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause. 
Maltz makes an alternative argument that public education 
could not have been thought a privilege or immunity of citizen-
ship under the Fourteenth Amendment because it was not 
deemed to be one of the privileges and immunities protected 
under the Comity Clause of Article Four. This is a more plausi-
ble objection to my thesis, at least insofar as the thesis rests on 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. As Maltz points out, "a child from state A, visit-
ing for one week in state B, would [not] have a right under the 
comity clause to attend the public schools of state B during his 
visit. "33 This is confirmed by numerous court decisions during 
the 19th century, which consistently hold that the privilege of 
free attendance at a public school is limited to bona fide resi-
dents of the school district.34 But these cases are best explained, 
I think, not on the ground that public education is not a civil 
right, but on the ground that the limitations were based on resi-
dence in the district rather than on citizenship in the state. This 
was relevant for two reasons. First, many early decisions held 
that, while discrimination against citizens of other states was un-
constitutional, discrimination against nonresidents was not. Citi-
zenship and residence, these decisions held, are not necessarily 
the same thing.3s Second, because the school attendance restric-
tions were based on the locality, not the state, a New Yorker 
33. Maltz, 13 Const. Comm. at 231 (cited in note 3). 
34. See, e.g., School District No. 1 v. Bragdon, 23 N.H. (3 Fost.) 507, 516 (1851) 
(children not entitled to be admitted to public school where their father resided in an-
other state and they were sent to be apprentices in the district in an attempt to evade the 
residency requirement); State ex ret. German Protestant Orphan Asylum v. Directors of 
School District No. 14, 10 Ohio St. 448, 448 (Ohio 1859) (orphans who are not children, 
wards, or apprentices of actual residents in the school district are not entitled to free 
admission to the public schools); Wheeler v. Burrow, 18 Ind. 14, 16-17 (1862) (residents of 
other states may not send their minor children into Indiana for the purpose of procuring 
an education, unless they become bona fide Indiana residents); State ex ret. Comstock v. 
Joint School District No.1, 65 Wis. 631,635-36, 27 N.W. 829 (1886) ("We find ourselves 
unable to assent to the proposition that a child residing in one school district has any 
absolute right, under any circumstances, to the privileges of the common school of an-
other district."); Binde v. Klinge, 30 Mo. App. 285, 288-89 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1888) (un-
emancipated minors whose parents live outside the school district are not entitled to free 
admission to public schools within the district, even if they have a more or less permanent 
home within the district); Board of Education of Winchester v. Foster, 116 Ky. 484,489, 76 
S.W. 354, 355 (Ky. Ct. App. 1903) (the privilege of free admission to public schools is 
limited to bona fide residents); see also Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass. (1 Mete.) 580, 
583 (1840) (residents of federal enclave are not entitled to send their children to public 
schools in the district). 
35. La Tourette v. McMaster. 248 U.S. 465, 470 (1919); Douglas v. New Haven R. 
Co., 279 U.S. 377, 386-87 (1929); Cummings v. Wingo, 10 S.E. 107, 110 (S.C. 1889). 
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seeking to attend public school in Philadelphia would have pre-
cisely the same right to do so (namely, none) that a Pittsburgher 
would have. Since the protections of the Comity Clause pertain 
only to discrimination on the basis of citizenship in another 
state,36 it would follow that district residency requirements would 
not violate the Clause. Under either theory, limiting the privi-
lege of school attendance to residents of the district would be 
constitutional, but it would not follow that the Comity Clause 
would permit a state to discriminate on the basis of state citizen-
ship with regard to public education. 
In any event, in light of Maltz's view that the right to share 
in the public school fund is protected under the Equal Protection 
Clause, the point is of no practical importance. It is significant 
not to whether school segregation was understood as unconstitu-
tional, but to the nice question of which Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is the source of that constitutional principle. In 
Originalism, I treated the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the 
dominant and most plausible source of constitutional authority 
prior to Slaughterhouse, and assumed that the shift to equal pro-
tection after Slaughterhouse was simply a tactical response to that 
decision.37 That still seems to me the most plausible theory. If 
Maltz is correct, however, then the Republicans, Morton and Ed-
munds, for example, who invoked equal protection even prior to 
Slaughterhouse had the stronger constitutional position. The 
Democrats' continued focus on privileges and immunities and 
neglect of the equal protection argument, which I interpreted as 
an indication that the privileges or immunities argument was the 
real meat of the debate, may instead have been a tacit admission 
that the equal protection argument was more difficult to refute. 
This point is of theoretical interest to those who are con-
cerned about the relation between the three substantive Clauses 
of Section One as originally understood, but it does not affect the 
originalist case for Brown. Even if the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause did not encompass public education, the alternative con-
stitutional theory put forward by supporters of the 1875 Act, 
equal protection, would suffice. 
It remains possible that the Republican majority in 1870-75 
either intentionally or unintentionally misstated the principles of 
the constitutional amendment they had supported in 1866-68. 
36. The Supreme Court held to the contrary in United Building & Construction 
Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 214-18 (1984). The decision seems wrong on 
textualist and originalist grounds, as Justice Blackmun (!) maintained in dissent (id. at 
224-27, 233). 
37. McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. at 1001-03 (cited in note 9). 
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But the most plausible and economical interpretation of the evi-
dence is that their actions in seeking to outlaw de jure school 
segregation were based on their understanding of the meaning of 
the Amendment. That understanding, being nearly contempora-
neous with ratification, is entitled to respect. 
